The pitfalls of lis pendens in transnational matrimonial jurisdiction disputes before English courts by Bantekas, I
Ilias.Bantekas@brunel.ac.uk (​mailto:Ilias.Bantekas@brunel.ac.uk​)

THE PITFALLS OF LIS PENDENS IN TRANSNATIONAL MATRIMONIAL JURISDICTION DISPUTES BEFORE ENGLISH COURTS












The EC Regulation concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, conveniently known as Brussels IIbis,​[1]​ is well known to family lawyers within Europe. Its aim was to harmonise the procedural aspects of cross-border family law with a view to rendering the field more objective and foreseeable. The choice of the particular instrument, by means of a regulation which has direct effect without the need for further implementation by member States, was meant to ensure that no unnecessary distortions infused the system and more significantly that no conflicting national law, no matter how revered, would prevail. The aim of this paper is not to provide a commentary-style analysis to the pertinent provisions of Brussels IIbis as this task has already been admirably achieved in the scholarly literature.​[2]​ 
Rather, the aim from the outset has been to explore the two principal jurisdictional bases underlying the Regulation with a view to assessing whether and to what degree forum non conveniens claims – or other forms of discretional stays - are compelling for the courts.​[3]​ This task would in previous years seemed futile in light of the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) judgment in Owusu,​[4]​ where it held that national courts could not decline jurisdiction under Article 2 of Brussels I​[5]​ in favour of the courts of a non-contracting State “even if the jurisdiction of no other contracting State is in issue or the proceedings have no connecting factors to any other contracting State”.​[6]​ Clearly, the ECJ was concerned with ensuring legal certainty which is the cornerstone of EC legislation setting up compulsory systems of jurisdiction, ​[7]​ as is the case with Brussels IIbis. However, in 2010 the High Court went on to dismiss, in large part (i.e. save for express mandatory provisions), the application of Owusu to matrimonial disputes involving a non-EU member State, as well as to Brussels IIbis as a whole,​[8]​ as did also recently the Court of Appeals.​[9]​ In the former case the High Court was inclined to direct that the courts of New York represented the most appropriate forum for the settlement of the particular matrimonial dispute, whereas in Mittal v Mittal the Court of Appeals distinguished the aims and language of Brussels I from Brussels IIbis, finding that the latter provides significant scope for discretionary stays in matrimonial disputes involving a non-EU country.​[10]​ The mantle must now be taken up by the ECJ with a view to deciding whether national courts possess discretionary powers in their application of Brussels IIbis even with respect to intra-EU matrimonial disputes.
	This paper finds the judgments in JKN v JCN and Mittal v Mittal compelling, not only because it agrees with the argument that there are no prohibited discretionary stays in Brussels IIbis, but also because the unchecked application of the lis pendens rule in the Regulation gives rise to several instances of injustice.​[11]​ The courts must achieve an appropriate balance between the legal certainty,​[12]​ as a cornerstone of the rule of law, envisaged by the Regulation, while at the same time limiting the undue advantages to the party first issuing by reason of the lis pendens rule and the habitual residence of the respondent. The curtailment of surprise suits must be considered an integral part of the rule of law dimension of the Regulation in the same manner as legal certainty. In most cases, surprise petitions (or “torpedoes” as they are jokingly known) lodged before English courts, even if blatantly forum shopping exercises and in bad faith of ongoing ADR procedures in other contracting States, are not susceptible to dismissal by English courts. The unreported case of Tsingreli v Elias​[13]​ demonstrates the pitfalls and injustices arising from a strict application of the lis pendens rule. Whereas the judgment itself does not provide any new legal insights, the unreported facts of the case are indicative of the pertinent problems. In this case the respondent underwent extensive, not to mention expensive, rounds of pre-trial evidence hearings all the way to the High Court in order to put his case forward in the most appropriate manner. This is certainly the case where the initial petition is lodged before a county court and the respondent considers the jurisdictional issue far too complex for that court to determine. That the respondent may ultimately be awarded full costs is little compensation after a long and arduous cross-border legal battle, which may have involved self-representation, only to discover that the petitioner has no assets in England and has transferred all other assets abroad to avoid being forced to pay the costs ordered.




The Meaning of Habitual Residence in English Jurisprudence since Brussels IIbis

One should distinguish habitual residence from mere residence. As the courts have correctly accepted, a person may be habitually resident in one country and at the same time be resident in several other jurisdictions. In this case, there can only be one habitual residence for the purpose of matrimonial jurisdiction under Brussels IIbis.​[15]​ Equally, a distinction should be made between habitual and permanent residence. For the purposes of Brussels II residence need only be habitual, not permanent.​[16]​ There are of course exceptional circumstances wherein a person is neither resident nor habitually resident anywhere, as would be the case with seafarers travelling around the world at the crucial time the divorce petition was lodged. 






The spatial test for establishing habitual residence is the date at which the relevant petition was lodged and this is clearly established in Marinos v Marinos.​[19]​ This is subject to several important considerations which are not always clear in the pertinent jurisprudence. For one thing, given that the assessment of jurisdiction is triggered by a petition by the plaintiff the latter possesses a definitive advantage over the respondent. Therefore, it would have been unjust for the law to admit as evidence of the respondent’s habitual residence any periods after the petition was lodged. The burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate on a balance of probabilities the respondent’s habitual residence on the crucial date. Equally, although the period prior to the crucial date is significant because it helps substantiate whether the respondent’s alleged residence is indeed habitual, this is not open-ended. As will be demonstrated, the courts have been inclined to stretch relevant periods only with a view to determining intent on the part of the respondent.  




The Subjective Test: The Proper Meaning and Role of Intention

The subjective test was not arbitrarily imported by English courts but has long been sustained by the ECJ’s jurisprudence.​[21]​ Such intention, no doubt, may be assessed upon objective criteria by the court.​[22]​ The meaning of intention is meaningful only in relation to the particular context of one’s interests. A person cannot, for the purposes of assessing habitual residence, intend to reside in one place yet retain his or her centre of interests in another. English courts generally employ intention in order to substantiate their finding of one’s centre of interests. As a result, they have taken a flexible view of the meaning of intention. Lord Scarman, for example, emphasised that this does not amount to “intention or expectation for the future which is implicit in the idea of permanence, but on immediately past events, namely the usual order of the applicant’s way of life and the place where in fact he has lived”.​[23]​ 




The Objective Test: The Centre of One’s Interests

In deciding “the centre of someone’s interests” due regard must be paid to all relevant factors. Thus, one factor alone is not determinant of habitual residence and this is also true for the duration of actual residence in a single place, albeit this remains a very important criterion.​[27]​ The ECJ has consistently held that in determining habitual residence reference must be made to the “intention that it should be of a lasting character, the permanent or habitual centre of his interests”.​[28]​ Moreover, “account should be taken in particular of the employed person’s family situation; the reasons which have led him to move, the length and continuity of his residence; the fact (where this is the case) that he is in stable employment; and his intentions”.​[29]​ This is no doubt reasonable but is not always easy to decipher in respect of those in flexible employment or the increasing numbers of cross-border commuters.  
In Tsingreli v Elias the respondent was a part-time professional in the UK who only spent brief teaching spells there, having chosen to live the majority of the year – approximately ten months – in Greece where his wife held a full-time job and where they shared a house and a family life with their children. The part-time job was the respondent’s principal profession and money-earning activity. This situation is not atypical in an era of cheap flights and where the cost of commuting to expensive cities such as London is now less expensive and practical. This explains the rise of cross-border flexible working patterns in Europe. London is ideal for such cross-border commuting given the abundance of airports, flights and convenient links to its centre. In most cases the cost of flights to European destinations is cheaper than rail travel within the UK.​[30]​ The situation is similar for the wealthy elite that own a range of private residences across the globe, spending various stretches of time in all or most of these, whilst their business interests lie scattered in several countries. Habitual residence in such circumstances becomes even more vexed where the respondent is a majority or minority shareholder in more than one undertakings, or holds the directorship of multiple companies in such a way that a court is unable to determine with any degree of accuracy the respondent’s more substantial centre of financial or business interests.
Whereas a typical assessment of habitual residence would assume that a person’s place work coincides with one’s personal interests, the aforementioned scenarios justify the distinction in many cases between one’s place of work from his or her centre of interests. The High Court in Marinos confirmed that “the place where the matrimonial home is to be found [as well as] the place where the family lives” is an important factor for ascertaining the habitual centre of a spouse’s interests.​[31]​ The same Court importantly ruled that despite the judgment in a much older labour-related ECJ case,​[32]​ there is no presumption that a worker is habitually resident in the country of his stable employment, especially where the worker’s family lives in another member State.​[33]​ Finally, it has been well established that the habitual centre of one’s interests, being the place where one establishes himself on a fixed basis includes: one’s social set, the place where one’s children are schooled or cared for, one’s doctors and other providers of services, one’s place of belongings and the like”.​[34]​ As a result, it was not a long stretch for the High Court in Tsingreli to rule that the respondent’s centre of interests were not in the UK, despite the fact that he owned two properties there. The Court was convinced that the respondent had not only relocated his family to Greece but despite the fact that he worked part-time in London he had severed all other ties with that city. When in London he stayed with friends, as opposed to renting a flat or a room, and flew back on every possible occasion. 
Marinos should be distinguished from Tsingreli on a point of fact. In Marinos, the plaintiff wife lived for the greater part of the year outside the UK but ultimately intended to return there. She had been studying law part-time in a British university​[35]​ and had retained fractional employment (33 percent contract) with British Airways which meant that she was in the UK for up to three months every year.​[36]​ The High Court lay greater emphasis on her intention to alter her habitual residence and the range of links she had retained in the UK than her physical presence in Greece which was substantial. This author is compelled to disagree with this reasoning because it perceives the plaintiff as an entity that is wholly distinct from her spouse and child, which all along and during the crucial date were living continuously outside the UK on the island of Corfu. If the centre of her interests lay in the UK it follows that her family life in Greece, her home there as well as her child’s schooling in Greece were meaningless. This conclusion certainly did not emerge from the proceedings. In any event, in Tsingreli the respondent husband never intended to return full-time to the UK and retained no visible social life there. In fact, he had never set up a pension plan in the UK and made it clear to his employer that he did not wish to return full-time at any point in the future. Holman J emphasised that even if the duration of the respondent’s time in the UK was longer than his stated 2-3 months per year it would have made little difference in respect of jurisdiction, because his entire lifestyle clearly suggested that for a number of years prior to the divorce petition the couple had entered into a conscious decision to live abroad, of which the respondent’s work in the UK was a mere financial implementation of that decision.​[37]​




The Operation of Lis Pendens and its Inconsistencies

Article 19(1) of Brussels IIbis sets out the operation of lis pendens. This means that where proceedings relating to divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment (same cause) are brought before the courts of more than one EC nation the court second seised​[38]​ shall of its own motion stay proceedings until the first seised court decides whether it enjoys jurisdiction in the case at hand. The same applies in respect of matters relating to parental responsibility. A reading of the pertinent provision does not immediately reveal whether it is to be construed in parallel with the general jurisdiction provision in Article 3, or whether it is hierarchically superior to Article 3.​[39]​ It has definitively been established that the lis pendens rule is binding on subsequent courts seised of the same matter and thus it does not constitute a mere rule of comity.​[40]​ The possibility may of course arise of a divorce petition being lodged first with the courts of country A whilst both the petitioner and the respondent are both habitually resident in country B. In such a case it is evident that the lis pendens rule overrides the general jurisdiction principle, albeit in the case at hand the job of the first seised court will simply be to declare lack of jurisdictional competence. Be this as it may, by the time the courts of country B reach a decision as to their obvious lack of jurisdiction, having observed the authority of the lis pendens rule, the respondent will have undergone legal expenses in a foreign country in pursuit of the forum shopping schemes of the petitioner.  
It is evident that the petitioner enjoys an advantage over the respondent in all cases by reason of being in a position of choosing a more convenient forum for commencing proceedings, preparation of paperwork, launch of a surprise attack in a foreign jurisdiction with strict deadlines to which the respondent must hurriedly comply, etc. It is no wonder that the abuse of the lis pendens rule in the context of Brussels I has been associated with so-called “torpedo” suits, whereby the petitioners seek to engage the jurisdiction of their choice by requesting declaratory judgments, typically entailing some sort of non-infringement recognition. For good reason there is a trend among senior European courts towards staying such abusive requests under Brussels I.​[41]​
	One thing that is not abundantly clear from the operation of the lis pendens rule is whether it is in force until the relevant petition is ultimately entertained by a court, or whether the general jurisdiction rule can at some point in time take over. An example should help illustrate the point and the complexities involved. P lodges a divorce petition before the courts of country X. The petition is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and R’s subsequent petition can now be entertained before the courts of Y which had stayed proceedings pending a decision from the courts of X. R, however, does not serve the petitioner and the petition stays dormant for a period of two years. During this time both R and P become habitual residents of X. Do the courts of X possibly enjoy jurisdiction now as a result of R’s inaction or does the operation of the initial lis pendens still strong hold? In such cases common sense must prevail. Given that the court first seised has stayed proceedings for lack of jurisdiction, the court second seised enjoys uninterrupted jurisdiction until it, itself, declares the same. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the divorce petition over which the second seised court (i.e. the courts of Y) possesses jurisdiction continues to relate to the initial critical date (i.e. the date when the first petition was lodged before the courts of X). Hence, the fact that the parties may have subsequently acquired new habitual residence or that the former respondent has failed to push proceedings through in the courts of the second seized is irrelevant. The second seised court continues to enjoy jurisdiction and in case of failure to serve the initial petitioner may lodge a new petition (under a new critical date) and serve anew. Of course, there is no guarantee that such a petition will pass the forum’s jurisdictional test.
	One crucial impediment to the just settlement of matrimonial jurisdiction imposed by the strict application of the lis pendens rule is its glaring indifference to the parties’ ongoing mediating and negotiating efforts prior to the formal lodging of any petition. The parties may well have decided to leave aside divorce proceedings until such time as they negotiate a settlement on custody and access rights in respect of their children. If one of the parties subsequently, and while negotiations are pending, lodges a divorce petition against the other unsuspecting party in a third jurisdiction the relevant provisions of Brussels IIbis are silent on the legal effects of the petitioner’s bad faith as indeed on the legal status of out-of-court procedures. This clearly leaves parties acting in good faith to the mercy of “crafty” lawyers.​[42]​ In many cases, such surprise suits leave the other party unprepared and with little time to seek sound legal advice in a foreign jurisdiction and very often failing to respond to the suit under the perception that it is too far-fetched and outrageous for any serious court to even consider.​[43]​ Although English courts have generally taken the sound approach by deferring judgment so that the courts of the country where the parties commenced other proceedings can determine under their own law whether such proceedings (e.g. mediation) constitute petitions under Article 19 of Brussels IIbis,​[44]​ the EC Commission seems to have paid little, or no attention, to this issue. In fact, the EC Mediation Directive,​[45]​ adopted five years after Brussels IIbis, and which encompasses cross-border family mediation, does not even hint at the issue and only addresses the binding character of mediation agreements and outcomes agreed to by the parties.​[46]​ No doubt, the absence of a relevant provision outright discourages parties from ADR in family disputes and one only wonders whether the EC has taken the matter seriously at all. Deferral to the law of member States is a poor compromise solution because just like the Mediation Directive, the jurisdictional conflict between ongoing ADR and cross-border suits is not regulated in the laws of EC member States. This is particularly so given that in the majority of cases the parties’ lawyers act as mediators or negotiators between their clients without an official mediation agreement. In practice, English courts, as was the case with the High Court in Tsingreli, will not even consider the respondent’s plea that the parties were in the midst of negotiation and mediation – where this is informal – and will go on to determine jurisdiction solely on the basis of habitual residence.  
In Tsingreli the parties had undertaken two rounds of litigation over visitation rights and custody of their children (which had never left the territory of Greece) by the time the plaintiff wife lodged divorce and parental responsibility petitions in England. The couple’s solicitors had agreed to resolve custody first before turning to settle the terms of the divorce and other financial matters. From the point of view of Greek civil procedural law this was the norm in contentious divorces, particularly since the three actions (i.e. divorce, finances and parental responsibility) are distinct and severable, which is not necessarily the case under English law. The Greek phase of the formal and informal ADR proceedings in Tsingreli commenced in October 2011, whereas the English petition was lodged in February 2012 before a county court. The respondent was not due to England for work for a good seven months, yet he was obliged in a state of utter surprise to seek counsel in a foreign jurisdiction and respond to the strict deadlines set out in the notice of proceedings. In his response to the registrar of the county court he attached copies of the decisions and out-of-court settlements approved by the Greek courts up to that point, as well as a notarised letter from his solicitor in Greece confirming the existence of ongoing divorce negotiations. The county court disregarded all of this evidence and in the first hearing before it the respondent was advised by his legal team to request deferral of the jurisdictional issue to the High Court as being better suited to deal with it. Thus, the county court essentially forced the respondent to travel overseas without any regard to the letter and spirit of Brussels IIbis, even though the evidence was compelling. Through a succession of three pre-trial hearings before the High Court the plaintiff went on to request a variety of documents from the respondent – who by that time was representing himself due to lack of funds – particularly of a tax nature. Some of this was peripheral to the question of jurisdiction and the aim of the plaintiff was to use it in subsequent litigation in Greece were she to fail in her English petition. Although the petition, as already stated, was ultimately dismissed by the High Court this was little compensation to the respondent. He was forced to endure thirteen months of litigation, with a significant financial, personal and professional cost, all of which could have been avoided had the county court acted as an appropriate filter for petitions of this nature. In this manner, potential plaintiffs would be seriously dissuaded from lodging frivolous suits.
Surely, once the courts of a country are seised of one aspect of a matrimonial dispute, such as parental responsibility, they are deemed seised of all its dimensions, including divorce and finances.​[47]​ A separated couple will not seek to judicially resolve its children’s custody but remain married. It is irrational therefore to assume that the various components of a matrimonial dispute constitute discrete disputes for the purposes of the lis pendens rule.
One should not also underestimate the psychological effects of a surprise suit in a foreign jurisdiction on the respondent. Unfortunately, there are no statistics on the numbers of respondents failing to respond to a court’s notice or subsequently agreeing to the terms of a divorce out of fear of being drawn in expensive litigation in England. Thus, although the facts in Tsingreli are exceptional, it still took the respondent thirteen months to prove his point. Many may have been compelled to settle in the face of protracted litigation in a foreign jurisdiction.
Tsingreli raises the question as to whether the lis pendens rule should extend to all disputes arising from a matrimonial dispute, as opposed only to those for which the plaintiff has issued first. By way of illustration, P issues for divorce and ancillary relief in England, albeit parental responsibility actions had already commenced in France by R. Article 19 of Brussels IIbis does not entertain this distinction and on this basis alone it seems valid, although by no means reasonable, to apply the lis pendens rule to each individual action. This is subject to a sole exception under Article 8 of Brussels IIbis, according to which matters pertaining to parental responsibility are to be resolved in the courts of the country where the child is habitually resident at the time the court is seized.​[48]​ Equally, the lis pendens rule may be exceptionally circumvented in urgent cases where the adoption of provisional, including protective, measures in respect of persons or assets are required in the courts of a country other than that first seised, which would not normally enjoy jurisdiction.​[49]​ In all of these circumstances, as indeed in many others, the courts’ discretional power of stay and deferral under the forum non conveniens doctrine would have made much more sense and avoided clear injustices, unnecessary expenses and forum shopping.




The Application of Forum Non Conveniens Claims 
in Brussels IIbis Jurisdictional Disputes

Arguments against habitual residence and claims in favour of forum non conveniens aim to deny that the courts of the forum country possess jurisdiction over a particular dispute. The idea that forum non conveniens can serve as complementary to a claim challenging the respondent’s habitual residence does not arise under Brussels IIbis in the context of matrimonial disputes other than for the purposes of assessing matters pertinent to children, whether in relation to parallel divorce proceedings or independent of these. Before we go on to consider this, however, it is instructive to assess whether either of the parties is entitled to lodge forum non conveniens claims in respect of Article 3 Brussels IIbis jurisdictional disputes, as well as whether the courts seised of such claims possess the authority or the discretion to entertain them. An additional question is whether said courts are additionally entitled to entertain forum non conveniens claims proprio motu, that is, independently of any claim made by the parties. The rationale of the EC Commission has been that although jurisdiction in civil matters is a vexed issue with no simple solutions, litigants must, at the very least, be subject to key jurisdictional norms applicable throughout the territory of the EU for the purpose of legal certainty, as already explained in the introduction. This was certainly the idea underlying Brussels I and the ECJ’s judgment in Owusu, where it went on to dismiss discretional stay judgments.​[51]​ 
	However, unless the EC Commission adopts pertinent legislation the rationale in Owusu cannot extend to all civil disputes and despite the fact that it constitutes a principle underlying the jurisdictional acquis of the EC in the field of civil jurisdiction its application cannot override fundamental rights and principles of justice.​[52]​ This conclusion is no doubt reinforced by judgments such as Mittal v Mittal and JKN v JCN which dismissed the effects of Owusu on Brussels IIbis.​[53]​ For the purposes of this analysis, Brussels IIbis distinguishes between two broad types of claims: those that concern jurisdiction in respect of general matrimonial matters, particularly divorce and ancillary relief and those claims that relate to children, particularly custody and access rights. The first is regulated under Article 3, whereas the latter principally by Article 15, which establishes a sui generis (exceptional) forum non conveniens entitlement for national courts only in relation to children in situations where it is deemed that the transfer of a case to another court would be in the child’s best interests. As regards Article 3, despite the establishment of a normative hierarchy in Brussels IIbis with lis pendens at the apex, supplemented by the rule of habitual residence,​[54]​  the relevant language is by no means inimical to discretionary stays. Lewison LJ had quite clearly emphasised that the language in Article 3 of Brussels IIbis was “intransitive and facilitative”.​[55]​ In our analysis of lis pendens it was demonstrated that the absence of a discretionary stay entitlement by the courts first seised may create serious distortions, procedural injustices and provide significant incentives for forum shopping, all of which Brussels IIbis was meant to eliminate.


Statutory Forum Non Conveniens under Article 15 Brussels IIbis

Under the terms of Article 15(1) of Brussels IIbis:

By way of exception, the courts of a member State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter may, if they consider that a court of another member State, with which the child has a particular connection, would be better placed to hear the case, or a specific part thereof, and where this is in the best interests of the child:

(a) stay the case or the part thereof in question and invite the parties to introduce a request before the court of that other member State in accordance with paragraph 4; or
(b) request a court of another member State to assume jurisdiction ...

This discretion to stay which is granted to national judges is just and reasonable but is not without its fair share of problems. For one thing and as things now stand, the forum non conveniens discretion under Article 15(1) applies only in respect of matters pertinent to children and does not affect other matrimonial disputes under Article 3, although this probably subject to debate following Mittal v Mittal. This means that the parties may well end up fighting legal battles in multiple jurisdictions, forcing one or the other, especially the one with humbler finances, to withdraw from part of the litigation altogether, or at least minimise his or her chances of success.​[56]​ Secondly, it is not altogether reasonable to assume that matrimonial disputes involving the couple’s finances are irrelevant to matters pertinent to the child’s welfare and parental responsibility. If the ultimate custodian is to lose the family home and most assets in ancillary relief proceedings in country X, yet manages to retain custody of the child in country Y, where he or she is not habitually resident, this is of little consolation to the child and certainly this state of affairs cannot be in its best interests.​[57]​ Thirdly, in more than one ways, protracted, acrimonious, matrimonial litigation is much more complex than the mere subset of direct family law-related petitions lodged by the parties. One of the spouses may be subject to criminal proceedings in respect of illegal telephone and email interception, child abuse, crimes unrelated to the parental responsibility petition at hand but wholly relevant to that parent’s ability to act in the child’s best interests, such as engagement in prostitution, drug trafficking etc. In all of these cases divorcing the element of parental responsibility from the matrimonial dispute as such is arbitrary and does not in most cases serve the child’s best interest.​[58]​ Yet, none of these legal actions are considered as triggering the lis pendens rule in favour of the jurisdiction where such actions have commenced.
	That national courts should be granted discretion to defer the whole web of matrimonial disputes to a better placed jurisdiction – other than simply matters pertinent to children​[59]​ – is further justified by the sharp differences in legal fees from one European jurisdiction to another. England has no doubt the highest legal fees in the EU, to which one must also calculate living and travel expenses in addition to hefty translation costs in respect of documents and services which the parties must necessarily produce. It is unreasonable that cases where borderline jurisdiction may lie with English courts should be entertained there if the parties are not well off financially and where the principal object of the petitioner is financial gain. This is even more so where the legal fees in the country of the parties constitute only a fraction of what they would have paid in England, taking into consideration that at the end of such litigation the real losers are the parties’ children who will be bereft of valuable financial resources which their parents squandered in pointless litigation elsewhere.
	

Some Sensible Recommendations: Conclusion

The combined effect of the habitual residence and lis pendens rule, although objectively fair, can cause significant injustice to litigants and harm the interests of their children.​[60]​ Moreover, the argument that discretionary stay powers infuse an element of arbitrariness and subjectivity in matrimonial proceedings is both incorrect and misleading. No statute, including EC regulations, can lay claim to immutable truths nor can they promise to encompass under an objective umbrella every conceivable situation. If they are drafted with such immutable objectivity in mind there will arise situations where great injustices will be meted out to the parties at hand. Flexibility, rather than obstinate rigidity, is a key ingredient to a good law with a view to dispending individualised justice, rather than sterile generalised justice​[61]​ with unfortunate consequences in minority cases. Instead, law-makers should learn to trust judges and their capacity and expertise to distinguish those cases where the pertinent jurisdictional rules, both general and exceptional, are clearly inadequate. Discretionary stay powers under such circumstances are hardly an expression of judicial arbitrariness and in time, especially in the European context where jurisdictional conflicts tend towards harmonisation in both case law and practice, the courts would at some point reach a particular consensus that would transform itself into precedent for the application of forum non conveniens in cross-border matrimonial disputes. The courts, not the Regulation itself, are best placed to ascertain those exceptional cases where the application of forum non conveniens is just, pertinent and in the interest of the parties.​[62]​
	The aim of this brief paper was not to iterate the jurisprudence of English courts on Brussels IIbis, but rather to highlight outstanding and problematic issues arising from the implementation of the Regulation in England and Wales; no doubt, the same set of problems are faced by other European courts. In the opinion of this author when the courts determine that the stay of jurisdiction in a particular matrimonial case is warranted by fundamental notions of justice, which it should set out in detail, then it is under a concrete obligation to take a firm stance, even if by doing so it may be deemed in violation of Brussels IIbis.​[63]​ Justice and fairness are building blocks of all national constitutions and legal orders, as well as of EC law-making – as indeed all international law-making​[64]​ - and hence an argument that justice-centred discretional stays are arbitrary and unlawful is without merit.​[65]​ This is particularly the case since in other matrimonial jurisdiction cases not involving Brussels IIbis English courts have relied on “fairness and convenience”.​[66]​
	By way of recommendation, courts should be able to exercise their forum non conveniens power in: 

a) situations where matrimonial disputes relating to finances will have a direct impact on the child’s welfare and best interests. As a result, they should consolidate relevant proceedings to a single jurisdiction as far as possible;

b) cases where peripheral issues are pending before the courts of a country that does not enjoy (first seised) jurisdiction under Articles 3 or 19 of Brussels IIbis and which issues are not strictly classified as matrimonial, but which have a direct bearing on the central matrimonial dispute, including the award of parental responsibility. These may encompass parallel criminal proceedings against one parent for child abuse or other criminal suits involving illicit activity that renders a parent inappropriate for custody.​[67]​

c) cases that involve a significant financial burden on the parties, whereas the same result can just as well be pursued in a jurisdiction more familiar and less expensive for both of them. This result is further justified by the financial circumstances of the parties, the need to call foreign witnesses to testify and the effect of protracted and expensive litigation on the living standards of their children and of themselves.
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